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Does managed care produce lower health care utilization and costs through better aligned 
financial incentives and alternative delivery methods (the “pure” HMO effect) or by attracting 
more healthy enrollees (enrollee selection)? The purpose of this paper is to shed new light on this 
fundamental question using a quasi-experimental approach that exploits the timing and county 
specific implementation of Medicaid managed care plans in two distinct sub-sets of Kentucky 
counties in the late 1990s. We find large differences in the relative success of each region in 
reducing utilization that are likely driven by important differences in plan design. Asthmatic 
children enrolled in the plan that was successful at reducing utilization did not appear to suffer 
adverse health outcomes as a result.  
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I. Introduction 
Managed care health insurance plans, such as Health Maintenance Organizations 
(HMOs), are generally thought of as a lower cost alternative to traditional Fee-For-Service (FFS) 
plans. In theory, managed care plans are able to reduce utilization and costs through a variety of 
mechanisms. One such mechanism is the capitation of fees paid to providers. Managed care 
plans often pay providers a lump sum per patient that does not vary based on the services 
provided to the patient. Thus, unlike with a FFS plan, under managed care the marginal revenue 
a physician receives from the provision of an additional service is zero. Capitated fees therefore 
create incentives for physicians to reduce utilization. Other features of managed care plans that 
may result in reduced utilization and costs include restricting enrollees to a specific list of 
covered providers, the use of primary care “gate-keeper” physicians that must provide prior 
authorization for specialist visits, careful monitoring of physician resource utilization, and the 
promotion of preventative care. These features are supposed to help ensure enrollees are 
receiving the appropriate level of care in the appropriate setting.
1
 
How popular are managed care plans? According to Glied (2000), over 70 percent of all 
Americans with health insurance were enrolled in some form of managed care by 1993. 
Policymakers have taken a particular interest in the possibility that managed care can lead to 
reductions in utilization and costs. The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 permitted new 
forms of managed care plans to participate in Medicare and also gave states the broad authority 
to mandate enrollment in Medicaid managed care plans without obtaining a federal waiver.
2
 
According to the Kaiser Family Foundation (2001), over half of all Medicaid beneficiaries were 
                                                 
1
 Various aspects of literature on managed care are reviewed in Glied (2000), Luft (1981), and Cutler and 
Zeckhauser (2000). 
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 For more discussion of Medicare managed care, see Kaiser Family Foundation (2007) Fact Sheet “Medicare 
Advantage” and for more discussion of Medicaid managed care, See Kaiser Family Foundation (2001) Fact Sheet 
“Medicaid and Managed Care”. 
3 
 
enrolled in a managed care plan in 2000. Despite the growth in the popularity of managed care 
plans, there remains very little convincing evidence on the impact of such plans on the utilization 
of health care services, health care costs, and health outcomes. 
Many researchers have pointed out that simply comparing the utilization of managed care 
enrollees with the utilization of FFS enrollees may not be informative due to the ability of 
enrollees in many circumstances to choose their health plan. The observation that managed care 
plans have lower costs than FFS plans could be explained by managed care plans 
disproportionately enrolling lower utilization / lower cost customers. Therefore a question that 
has persistently plagued both researchers and policymakers alike is whether HMOs and other 
forms of managed care produce lower health care utilization through better aligned financial 
incentives and alternative delivery methods (the pure HMO effect) or by attracting more healthy 
enrollees (enrollee selection). 
The purpose of our paper is to shed new light on this question of the “pure” HMO effect 
versus “enrollee selection” using a quasi-experimental approach that exploits the timing and 
county specific implementation of Medicaid managed care mandates in Kentucky in the late 
1990s. The Medicaid program in Kentucky was changed from a FFS system to a managed care 
system in two geographically distinct sub-sets of counties, so we can compare recipients initially 
in each of the two sets of “treatment” counties before and after this reform with recipients 
initially in neighboring “control” counties that remained in a FFS system in order to assess the 
impact of Medicaid managed care on child health care utilization (i.e., changes along the 
intensive margin). 
Having two distinct treatment regions built around the two largest cities in the state 
(Louisville and Lexington) is one unique aspect of this reform. Differences in the managed care 
4 
 
plans established in each region motivate our heterogeneous treatment effect approach of 
modeling the impact of each plan separately. The Louisville-centered plan (Passport) elected to 
reimburse physicians using a capitated payment scheme, while the Lexington-centered plan 
(Kentucky Health Select or KHS) opted for a modified FFS reimbursement scheme for 
physicians. Another important difference is that the Louisville-centered plan contracted out 
administrative responsibilities such as utilization review to an experienced managed care 
organization while the Lexington-centered plan decided to handle such responsibilities 
internally. The Louisville-centered plan continues to serve Medicaid patients today, while the 
Lexington-centered plan ceased operations after two and a half years. 
A few recently published papers (Duggan (2004) and Aizer, Currie, and Moretti (2007)) 
have attempted to address similar issues using Medicaid managed care mandates in California 
that occurred at roughly the same time.
3
 The unique implementation of Medicaid managed care 
in Kentucky and our empirical strategy allow us to make several new and important 
contributions to the literature. Unlike California, Kentucky required that Medicaid managed care 
plans provide encounter data for enrollees in a similar format to what was previously reported 
under the FFS regime. Therefore, a major contribution of our paper is that we observe any 
changes in utilization among Medicaid recipients moving into managed care. Another novel 
feature of our paper is that we focus on children enrolled for 30 consecutive months of Medicaid 
coverage in order to isolate the managed care effect on the utilization of a group for which we 
have some priors about potential changes in utilization patterns.
4
 Our focus on the continually 
enrolled helps to eliminate confounding factors, such as the effect of lagged insurance coverage, 
                                                 
3
 A related paper, Currie and Fahr (2005), uses nationally representative data from the National Health Interview 
Survey to evaluate the impact of Medicaid managed care growth on the probability that individual children were 
Medicaid-covered and their utilization of care. 
4
 In general, children are much less likely to be hospitalized than adults, so we anticipate that a managed care 
program would focus on reducing the number of office visits or outpatient services consumed by children. 
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on current utilization. A third key feature is that we deal with migration endogeneity by 
instrumenting actual managed care enrollment with managed care eligibility based on initial 
county of residence, which we observe nearly one full year before the implementation of 
managed care. Fourth, we show that our comparison of border sharing counties in Kentucky 
makes for a very homogenous set of treatment and control groups. By looking at geographic 
areas that are contiguous and relatively homogenous – yet treated very differently by the 
implementation of managed care – we feel more confident that the effects we measure do not 
represent other omitted county-level factors. Fifth, we use data from the March Current 
Population Survey (CPS) to investigate whether or not the reform had an impact on Medicaid 
enrollment decisions of children (i.e., changes along the extensive margin). Finally, we examine 
whether reductions in health care utilization had detrimental impact on the health of a vulnerable 
population, children with asthma. 
Along the intensive margin, we find that both managed care plans decreased outpatient 
utilization among the children in our sample, though the Louisville-centered plan was able to do 
so to a greater degree (a 66 percent reduction versus a 21 percent reduction). In addition, both 
programs appear to have had a minimal impact on inpatient utilization for children, which may 
be explained by low baseline inpatient utilization rates. Another important difference between 
the two programs is that the Louisville-centered plan reduced professional (physician) utilization 
by 47 percent among children, while in the Lexington-centered plan professional (physician) 
utilization actually increased by 3 percent. Therefore, the heterogeneous treatments generated by 
differences in plan design between the two regions led to different outcomes with respect to 
utilization. These results, based on roughly a year and a half of post-reform data, foreshadow the 
eventual failure of the Lexington-based plan. Along the extensive margin, we see some evidence 
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of movement of children out of Medicaid coverage and into no coverage. Finally, we find 
suggestive evidence that the reductions in utilization observed in the Louisville-centered plan did 
not lead to adverse health outcomes for asthmatic children, as measured by inpatient 
hospitalizations. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section II provides a description of the policy 
change in Kentucky Medicaid. Section III reviews the literature on the impact of managed care 
on utilization and describes how our approach contributes to this literature. Our methodological 
approach and identification strategy is described in section IV and our data in section V. Section 
VI presents our results, section VII describes the results of some specification checks, and 
section VIII concludes with a discussion of policy implications. 
 
II. The Introduction of Managed Care in Kentucky Medicaid 
Brief History 
In October 1995, the Commonwealth of Kentucky received Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid (CMS) approval to initiate a major restructuring of the Kentucky Medicaid program by 
dividing the state into eight regional managed care networks. Within each region public and 
private providers were expected to collaborate to form managed care partnerships to oversee the 
provision of Medicaid services, rather than contracting these services out to commercial 
managed care providers. The goals of this restructuring were to improve access and quality of 
care within Kentucky Medicaid, stabilize cost growth, and emphasize primary care and 
prevention. 
In November 1997, Medicaid managed care enrollment began in the two regions that 
contain the state’s two major urban areas, region 3 (anchored by Louisville) and region 5 
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(anchored by Lexington). These, along with the other regions, are labeled in Figure 1. The 
managed care plan covering region 3 was named the Passport Health Plan (Passport) and the 
managed care plan covering region 5 was named the Kentucky Health Select Plan (KHS). 
Ultimately, the other six regions were not able to successfully create managed care partnerships. 
Passport, designed around the University of Louisville network, was charged with providing 
Medicaid managed care coverage to all Medicaid recipients in Jefferson County (containing 
Louisville) and 15 surrounding counties. Similarly, the KHS plan was designed around the 
University of Kentucky network and was charged with providing Medicaid managed care to all 
Medicaid recipients in Fayette County (containing Lexington) and 20 surrounding counties.
5
 As 
mentioned above, one motivating factor behind these partnerships was to prevent the state from 
exercising its option to open up for bidding the exclusive rights to these managed care contracts 
to commercial insurers.
6
 
Both plans also agreed to continue reporting encounter data to the state as they had under 
Medicaid FFS reimbursement rules. Because the plans were made up of local providers that were 
already accustomed to reporting claims to the state for billing purposes, this did not represent a 
change in reporting practice. This model of having a single community-organized health system 
                                                 
5
 There are some Medicaid recipients in these counties that are excluded from managed care. They include those in 
nursing facilities or psychiatric facilities for an extended stay, those served under home and community-based 
waivers, and those who must spend down to meet eligibility income criteria. 
6
 Currie and Fahr (2005) cite reports from the Health Care Financing Administration that classify the Medicaid 
managed care penetration rate in Kentucky as over 50 percent in 1992, 1993, and 1994. This is likely due to 
Kentucky Medicaid’s primary care case management program (KENPAC) where recipients are assigned a specific 
primary care provider. Although a primary care “gatekeeper” physician is one part of most managed care programs, 
we do not consider this feature alone to be enough to characterize a plan as being managed care. The fact that the 
state had to obtain CMS approval before introducing Passport and KHS suggests the same thing. One challenge 
facing any national Medicaid study is in understanding the institutional details of the programs in each state.  
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(COHS) manage care in a given region without accepting commercial bids was one of several 
models used in California to implement Medicaid managed care.
7
 
The region 5 partnership dissolved within two and a half years of its introduction. Today 
Medicaid recipients in region 3 are still covered under the Passport managed care plan, while 
Medicaid recipients in the rest of the state (including recipients in region 5) are covered under 
Fee-For-Service (FFS) Medicaid.
8
 Table 1 provides trends in overall and managed care 
eligibility over time. The table suggests that these two regions account for almost half of the 
state's total population and roughly 35 percent of the state's Medicaid population. Table 1 also 
suggests that Medicaid is an important potential source of insurance coverage in Kentucky. Our 
analysis will focus on the heterogeneous impact of Passport and KHS in their respective regions 
over a 30 month time period, January 1997-June 1999. 
State Capitation Payments to Passport and KHS 
Both Passport and KHS were given the responsibility of providing comprehensive health 
care coverage for their Medicaid enrollees in exchange for capitation payments (flat monthly 
fees per recipient based on their category of eligibility) negotiated with the state. In each region, 
separate monthly capitation rates were negotiated for six different eligibility categories: 
ADFC/TANF, SOBRA, children in foster care, SSI eligibles with Medicare, SSI eligibles 
without Medicare, and SCHIP. The monthly capitation rates for most of the timeframe we 
analyze in this paper are presented in Table 2. These capitation rates were based in part on 
                                                 
7
 As is discussed in Duggan (2004) and Aizer, Currie and Moretti (2007), California also used competition between 
one commercial plan and one private not-for-profit, Medicaid only HMO to select a single managed care provider in 
some counties. A third model used in some California counties, the Geographic Managed Care (GMC) approach, 
was to contract with several commercial HMOs and provide individual recipients in a county with choices. 
8
 The discussion of the history and institutional structure of the Passport and KHS health plans presented here draws 
in large part from Bartosch and Haber (2004), a report completed by RTI International for the Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services. 
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Medicaid FFS utilization data from State Fiscal Years 1995 and 1996.
9
 Due to higher historical 
utilization patterns, Passport initially received higher capitation rates for almost every eligibility 
category (November 1997 to June 1998). However, in fiscal year 1999 the rates were adjusted so 
that the KHS capitation rates in many eligibility categories exceeded the Passport rates. 
Appendix Table 1 presents a list of the services covered under these capitation payments and 
those excluded for both plans. The excluded services were to be covered by the state directly 
through FFS reimbursement or capitated through a separate waiver. 
Plan Reimbursement for Providers 
 The two plans selected very different reimbursement mechanisms for their providers. 
Passport elected to reimburse primary care providers (PCPs) on a capitated basis, with the 
capitation rate adjusted for the age, gender, and eligibility mix of their patients (SSI beneficiaries 
dually-eligible for Medicare and Medicaid were excluded from capitation). PCPs were at risk for 
primary care services only, while certain services including prenatal care, EPSDT services, and 
immunizations would be reimbursed on a FFS basis. In addition, PCPs were eligible for 
performance-based bonuses based on such activities as extending office hours, maintaining an 
appointment reminder system, accepting new patients, and meeting goals for utilization of 
emergency room visits, inpatient days, and specialty referral costs. In order for Passport to better 
measure resource use, an encounter claims bonus of roughly $1 for every non-FFS claim 
submitted was also established for PCPs. Hospital reimbursement was set up on a per diem basis 
using the Medicaid fee schedule with a 10 percent withhold.
10
 
 KHS instead elected to reimburse physicians and hospitals on a FFS basis using the 
Medicaid fee schedule with a 20 percent withhold. This means that physicians would receive 80 
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 See Bartosch and Haber (2004) for a detailed description of determinants of the capitation rates in Kentucky. 
10
 The current Medicaid fee schedule for Kentucky is available at the following URL: http://chfs.ky.gov/dms/fee.htm 
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percent of the fee associated with each service performed and the remaining 20 percent was held 
back until the end of the year to be used as a potential reward for meeting budget targets. PCPs 
were organized into “pools of doctors” or PODs with each POD assigned a budget by KHS. If 
actual health care expenditures attributed to the POD exceeded the budget, then the proportion of 
the 20 percent withhold returned to the POD at the end of the year would be reduced. If the POD 
came in under budget, then the entire withhold would be returned as well as the surplus. 
Summary of the Key Differences between the Plans 
 As described above, a key difference between the two plans was the way in which 
physicians were reimbursed. Passport used capitation, while KHS opted for FFS with a 20 
percent withhold. It is reasonable to assume that this created very different financial incentives 
for providers in the two regions. Under the Passport plan, the marginal revenue generated for a 
PCP from an additional office visit is essentially zero. On the other hand, PCPs still received 
additional revenue from additional visits under the KHS plan. Although the withhold may have 
encouraged some utilization reduction, it is important to note that this bonus was not measured at 
the level of the individual provider. Therefore, each individual physician may have had an 
incentive to “free ride” off of the utilization reductions generated by other members of their 
POD, while keeping their own schedule full.  
 Another key difference between the two plans was the way in which they performed 
basic administrative functions, such as claims processing, member/provider services, case 
management, and information sharing. Passport opted to outsource these responsibilities to an 
administrative service organization (ASO), AmeriHealth Mercy Health Plan, based in 
Philadelphia. KHS decided to handle these responsibilities internally, despite a lack of 
experience at managing a managed care network. To the extent that managed care plans reduce 
11 
 
utilization/spending through increased coordination of care and careful review of physician 
practice patterns, experience in these basic administrative functions may be crucial. Passport's 
choice to outsource these functions to an experienced ASO may have contributed to its relative 
success at reducing utilization among its enrollees. 
 These initial choices made by Passport (capitating reimbursement for PCPs and 
outsourcing important administrative functions to an experienced ASO) created a plan that was 
in many ways much closer to a “textbook” HMO than the KHS plan. Thus, we would anticipate 
Passport to be more successful at reducing utilization than KHS. As we discuss further below, 
this motivates our “heterogeneous treatment” approach of modeling the impact of managed care 
separately in each region. 
 
III. Literature Review and Our Contributions 
While there is no shortage of academic papers examining the impact of managed care on 
health care utilization and expenditures, as pointed out in Luft (1981), Miller and Luft (1994), 
Miller and Luft (1997), and Glied (2000), the vast majority suffer from the inability to identify 
the “pure” HMO effect due to enrollee selection. Glied (2000) provides a thorough review of the 
literature and concludes that most studies rely on multivariate controls to attempt to remove the 
effects of selection on the results. One obvious exception that focuses on the working age 
population is the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, which used random assignment into 
managed care (Manning et al. (1984)). The RAND experiment found managed care enrollees had 
overall lower health care utilization and expenditures, with fewer hospital admissions and similar 
use of outpatient services. As mentioned in Glied (2000), these results are broadly consistent 
with the nonrandomized studies summarized in Luft (1981). Mello, Stearns, and Norton (2002) 
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review the literature on Medicare managed care and find similar results for the Medicare 
population in their own analysis using simultaneous equations methods. 
 Kaestner, Dubay, and Kenney (2005) review the literature of the effects of Medicaid 
managed care on health care utilization and health outcomes. The results here are generally 
mixed and suffer from the same problems as the general literature on managed care. There are a 
few recently published studies that take advantage of California county-level Medicaid managed 
care mandates in a similar fashion to our paper. Duggan (2004) examines the impact of managed 
care on Medicaid spending and birth outcomes. Aizer, Currie, and Moretti (2007) also examine 
the impact of managed care on birth outcomes. 
There are several differences between the Kentucky reform and the California reform that 
we exploit to our advantage. First, unlike in Kentucky, the California Medicaid managed care 
data used in the literature has no information on utilization for Medicaid managed care 
recipients. Duggan (2004) focuses on Medicaid capitation payments rather than utilization in his 
individual level analysis and looks at birth outcomes at the county level using hospital discharge 
data rather than Medicaid claims data. Aizer, Currie, and Moretti (2007) focus on birth 
outcomes, rather than overall utilization, using the California Birth Statistical Master File and 
Birth Cohort files. A second issue with the California Medicaid data is that the mandates for 
managed care were not binding for much larger groups of recipients and services than in 
Kentucky. For example, in some California counties undocumented workers, SSI recipients, and 
foster children were not required to participate in Medicaid managed care. In Kentucky, 
Medicaid managed care is mandatory for SSI recipients and foster children if they live in any of 
the managed care counties. Both California papers attempt to deal with this issue in their analysis 
13 
 
of birth outcomes by focusing on those in their data for whom the managed care mandate is most 
likely to be binding. 
 Our empirical approach also differs from the previous literature in several important 
ways. First, we focus on health care utilization, rather than expenditures. Therefore, our paper is 
most closely related to the Duggan (2004) individual level analysis of the impact of managed 
care on Medicaid expenditures (as measured by state capitation payments). Economic theory 
makes stronger predictions about the impact of managed care on utilization (Q) relative to 
expenditures (P*Q), because it is often harder to predict or measure how managed care will 
affect health care prices (P). Second, we focus on children continuously enrolled in Medicaid for 
the entire 30 month time period analyzed. Third, we account for migration endogeneity. Fourth, 
we are starting with much more homogenous treatment and control groups than previous work 
and we use the same individual recipient data to examine changes in utilization and health 
outcomes for children with asthma. Finally, we bring in outside data from the CPS to examine 
changes in Medicaid take up rates for children along the extensive margin. 
 
IV. Methods and Identification Strategy 
Identifying the Impact of Medicaid Managed Care 
 It is well recognized by health economists that selection bias represents a key barrier to 
assessing the impact of managed care on utilization. In many settings, especially in the private 
market, consumers have the choice between some form of a managed care plan and a FFS plan. 
Since the managed care plan represents the cheaper, but less generous option, it will tend to be 
more attractive to healthier individuals.
11
 We refer to this as “enrollee selection.” Thus the lower 
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 Cutler and Reber (1998) show that younger and healthier individuals at Harvard switched to less generous health 
plans after cost-sharing arrangements were changed, leading to an “adverse selection death spiral.” 
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costs per managed care enrollee may reflect more stringent financial incentives on providers and 
alternative delivery methods, a healthier pool of participants (enrollee selection), or both. To 
identify the “pure” HMO effect one needs to keep the health composition within each type of 
plan constant, and, in general, OLS estimates will fail to do so and thus overstate the pure HMO 
effect. 
In the context of public health insurance, especially Medicaid, the selection issues are 
perhaps somewhat different. The Medicaid population is poor and typically faces no copayments, 
premiums, or deductibles. In some contexts – such as the California Medicaid managed care 
setting that Duggan (2004) and Aizer, Currie and Moretti (2007) studied – recipients were 
initially able to voluntarily choose Medicaid managed care or stay in FFS, and then some 
California counties later mandated managed care enrollment. At least in the voluntary setting, it 
is not clear that the financial incentives to be in a managed care plan are very strong because 
Medicaid FFS plans tend to have little patient cost-sharing. Thus, it is not clear whether the 
selection bias will be the same as in the private setting. 
In the Kentucky context, the switch from FFS to managed care was mandatory for a large 
portion of the Medicaid population, occurred at essentially one point in time, and was 
implemented in some, but not all Kentucky counties. In other words, a Medicaid recipient could 
not simply choose to opt into a managed care program, instead enrollment was based purely on 
county of residence. Therefore, enrollees in certain counties were automatically enrolled in 
managed care, while those in neighboring counties outside the managed care boundaries were 
not. This description of managed care implementation in Kentucky suggests a “difference-in-
differences” approach to identify the impact of managed care on health care utilization that is 
free from the “enrollee selection” that plagues much of the literature. 
15 
 
One option for implementing this “difference-in-differences” approach would be to 
collect monthly enrollment and utilization data on all Medicaid enrollees in all 120 Kentucky 
counties before and after the reform. We could run a regression with an indicator of any monthly 
utilization as the dependent variable and an indicator of managed care enrollment, which would 
equal zero for all recipients in the pre-period and equal one for those living in one of the 37 
managed care counties in the post period, as the independent variable. Thus we would be 
comparing the monthly utilization of those living in the 37 managed care counties before and 
after the reform with those living in any of the other 83 counties (see Figure 1). 
While such an approach would shed light on the impact of managed care, it suffers from 
several problems. First, it would treat managed care counties containing Kentucky's largest cities 
(Louisville in Jefferson county and Lexington in Fayette county) the same as much more rural 
managed care counties. In addition, these cities served as the “hub” for managed care activities 
within their respective regions, so they are also different from more rural areas in that regard. It 
may be the case that because Jefferson county contains Louisville, it is too different from other 
Kentucky counties for any comparison to be feasible. Second, it may not be reasonable to use 
counties in the far eastern or western parts of the state as controls for managed care counties in 
central Kentucky. Table 3 provides a descriptive comparison of each of the eight proposed 
managed care regions using “QuickFacts” data from the U.S. Census and confirms that there are 
important differences between the regions.
12
 Third, there are also important differences in 
utilization patterns in adults versus children, so an analysis of all enrollees would ignore these 
differences. Finally, it does not address the potential endogeneity of residence. Enrollees may 
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 Table 3 suggests that the Passport region (region 3) has a lower percentage of white inhabitants than any other 
region and is among the highest in terms of high school graduation rates. The KHS region (region 5) has the second 
lowest percentage of white inhabitants and the lowest homeownership rate. The poverty rate in both managed care 
regions is much lower than in regions 4, 7, and 8.  
16 
 
move across county lines in order to opt in or opt out of managed care. We refer to this as 
“migration endogeneity.” 
Given these concerns, an alternative approach would be to focus our attention on 
enrollees in the outermost counties in both managed care regions that share a border with a FFS 
county. These outermost managed care counties and their FFS neighbors are likely to make for 
much more homogenous treatment and control groups than would be the case if we used all 120 
counties. These outermost managed care counties are also more likely to have been “followers” 
rather than “leaders” in terms of setting managed care policy for their regions. This “border 
county” approach is motivated by, among others, the Black (1999) analysis of the effects of 
school test scores on housing prices. By looking at geographic areas that are contiguous and 
relatively homogeneous - yet are treated very differently by the implementation of managed care 
- we feel more confident that any measured impacts do not represent other omitted county-level 
factors. 
In order to address migration endogeneity, we use managed care eligibility based on 
county of residence in January 1997 as a proxy for actual managed care enrollment. Presumably, 
choice of residence in January 1997 is exogenous to the implementation of the Medicaid 
managed care that occurred in November 1997. We also follow the literature and focus on our 
attention on children, specifically children enrolled continuously from January 1997 to June 
1999.
13
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 Some studies analyze individuals with Medicaid spells as short as one month, yet there are a number of 
challenges with using short Medicaid spells to measure the impact of managed care. First, Medicaid eligibility 
changes are often associated with other changes in socioeconomic circumstances (such as changes in income, 
private insurance status, and marital status of the parent) that are difficult to observe in administrative data but may 
independently affect health care utilization. For example, children who newly enroll in Medicaid due to a drop in 
parent’s income (and perhaps loss in private health insurance) may have utilization that is incorrectly attributed to 
the managed care or FFS arrangement rather than the drop in income. On the other hand, children who are made 
eligible for Medicaid due to marital dissolution may be less likely to use health care due to the increased time 
constraints on the single parent. Second, lagged insurance coverage could affect current utilization. For example, 
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While this alternative approach is promising, there is one final issue to be addressed: 
whether or not it makes sense to model the managed care “treatments” in each region as being 
homogeneous. The description of the differences in implementation across the two regions 
suggests that we should model the impact of managed care in each region separately. Our use of 
separate border county FFS control groups for each region should handle other baseline 
differences between the two regions, such as differences in baseline utilization. 
To summarize our empirical strategy, we define separate treatment and shared-border 
control counties for each of the two managed care regions and track the utilization of all children 
that i) live in those counties in January 1997 and ii) are continuously enrolled in Medicaid until 
June 1999. Figure 2 illustrates the 4 Passport treatment and 7 control counties as well as the 9 
KHS treatment and 14 control counties used in this analysis.
14
 Table 4 provides a descriptive 
comparison of the treatment and control counties using “QuickFacts” data from the U.S. Census. 
The first two columns describe the Passport treatment and control counties, followed by the KHS 
treatment and control counties. We also present descriptions of Passport and KHS counties that 
share a common border. For both Passport and KHS, the treatment and control counties are very 
                                                                                                                                                             
uninsured children who enroll in Medicaid may initially have increased utilization due to pent-up health care 
demand, yet this could be incorrectly identified as a HMO effect. Third, as Cutler and Gruber (1996) note, there are 
children who are eligible, but not participating in the Medicaid program who might be viewed as having conditional 
Medicaid coverage. What this means is that when the child gets sick, it may be relatively easy to enroll the child in 
Medicaid. Similar to the pent-up demand story, conditional coverage may incorrectly attribute utilization to 
managed care or FFS plans. For each of these reasons, the results from an analysis of non-continuous enrollment 
spells are likely to be biased if there are differential take-up rates in managed care and FFS counties. Although we 
observe long-run insurance status and utilization far more accurately than previous work, by restricting the sample 
of Kentucky children to those who were continuously enrolled, it is likely that the children are poorer and less 
mobile than other Medicaid recipients. In order to evaluate this formally, we examined data from the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) from 1997-1999. We find that children continuously enrolled in Medicaid 
tend to be more disadvantaged than those with intermittent Medicaid enrollment. Additionally, sources of health 
insurance coverage for these children when not formally participating in the Medicaid program varied with the 
length of time spent on Medicaid. This suggests that our results based on continuously enrolled children may not be 
generalizable to the Medicaid population as a whole.  
14
 The Passport treatment counties are Breckinridge, Grayson, Larue, and Marion and the control counties are 
Hancock, Ohio, Butler, Edmonson, Hart, Green, and Taylor. The KHS treatment counties are Lincoln, Rockcastle, 
Jackson, Estill, Powell, Montgomery, Nicholas, Harrison, and Owen and the control counties are Pulaski, Laurel, 
Clay, Owsley, Lee, Wolfe, Menifee, Bath, Fleming, Robertson, Bracken, Pendleton, Grant, and Gallatin. 
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similar in terms of measurable county-level characteristics. Observable differences across the 
two regions further motivate separate Passport and KHS analyses. Finally, it is interesting to 
observe how similar the Passport and KHS counties are that share a common border. Later we 
compare the impact of the different managed care “treatments” in each these two similar sets of 
counties. 
Empirical Model Specification for Analyzing Changes along the Intensive Margin 
As mentioned above, the key issue which motivates the instrumental variables approach 
we adopt in this paper is that mobility across Kentucky’s 120 counties is non-trivial, and could 
be correlated with the implementation of Medicaid managed care. Put differently, location could 
be endogenous to health care utilization and Medicaid generosity. In the broader literature on 
welfare benefits, Gelbach (2004) convincingly finds that among women likely to use welfare, 
movers move to higher-benefit states, and do so earlier in the life cycle. If one believes that state-
to-state moves occur due to differences in cash welfare generosity, then county-to-county moves 
(which are clearly less costly for families) due to differences in Medicaid generosity may be an 
important issue to account for. 
To do so, we argue that county of residence in January 1997 is exogenous to the 
implementation of the Medicaid managed care that occurred in November 1997. Thus, we 
predict managed care enrollment separately in each region based on the interaction of two 
variables: time period (pre- or post-implementation) and whether the initial county of residence 
becomes a managed care county. In other words, in each region we are using managed care 
eligibility based on county of residence in January 1997 as an instrument for actual managed 
care enrollment. This exogenous eligibility measure should not affect health care utilization 
except through its effect on actual managed care enrollment. 
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Our first stage models for each region, estimated as linear probability models, are given 
below: 
HMOijt =β0 + β1 HMO_elig_Passport_initial_countyit + β2 Age_6-12it  
+ β3 Age_13-18it + Month_Year_Dummies β4 + αi + εijt 
 
(1a) 
HMOijt = β0 + β1 HMO_elig_KHS_initial_countyit + β2 Age_6-12it  
+ β3 Age_13-18it + Month_Year_Dummies β4 + αi + εijt 
 
(1b) 
where HMO represents actual managed care enrollment for child i in county j at time t, 
HMO_elig_Passport_initial_county represents Passport eligibility for child i based on initial 
county of residence and current time period (i.e. it equals 1 if the child initially resided in a 
Passport county, and the time period is November 1997 onward), 
HMO_elig_KHS_initial_county represents KHS eligibility for child i based on initial county of 
residence and current time period, and Month_Year_Dummies is a vector containing an indicator 
for each of the 30 months (January 1997 to June 1999) in our sample.
15
 We also include two 
indicators for different child ages, child fixed effects (αi), and εijt represents a standard error term. 
The inclusion of child fixed effects controls for time-invariant child characteristics that are not 
observed in our administrative data. 
Our second stage, which examines three types health care utilization (professional, 
outpatient, and inpatient services), is also estimated as a separate linear probability model for 
each region: 
Any_Monthly_Utilizationijt = β0 + β1 HMOijt + β2 Age_6-12it + β3 Age_13-18it 
+ Month_Year_Dummies β4 + αi + εijt 
 
(2) 
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 Recall that a child must be enrolled in Kentucky Medicaid for all 30 months in order to be included in our sample. 
Therefore a child that moves from Kentucky to another state would not be included even if their Medicaid coverage 
across the two states was uninterrupted.  
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where Any_Monthly_Utilizationijt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if child i in county j used one 
of our measures of health care utilization in month t (outpatient, professional, or inpatient), HMO 
represents actual HMO enrollment in our OLS specifications and predicted HMO enrollment 
from the first stage in our IV specifications, and the other variables are defined as before.
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Empirical Model Specification for Analyzing Changes along the Extensive Margin 
 Although our Medicaid administrative data allows us to precisely measure health care 
utilization for children, one limitation is that it is less useful for measuring impacts along the 
extensive margin, i.e., the decision to participate in Medicaid. If one views switching from FFS 
to managed care as implicitly reducing the generosity of Medicaid, then one may expect both 
reductions in utilization (which we measure with the administrative data) and reductions in 
program participation.
17
 Focusing on utilization alone may therefore ignore an important part of 
the cost-savings from switching to managed care and a margin of adjustment that may also be 
important to policymakers. 
 Because we rely on the household-based March Current Population Survey (CPS) to 
examine participation, our empirical approach is somewhat different than for the intensive 
margin. We focus on repeated cross-sections of children under age 18 from Kentucky, and 
estimate linear probability models of the form: 
INSURANCEijt = β0 + β1 HMO_elig_current_countyit + Xijt β2 
+ Year_Dummies β4 + Region_Dummies β5 + εijt 
 
(3) 
where INSURANCEijt represents Medicaid coverage, private coverage, or no coverage, and is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the child had that coverage at any time during the previous calendar 
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 For a discussion of the use of linear probability models in two state least squares estimation see Angrist and 
Krueger (2001) and Kelejian (1971).  
17
 Yelowitz (1998) found that the rising value of Medicaid for the SSI-disabled population was responsible for 20 
percent of caseload growth from 1987 to 1993. 
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year. Since the dataset is cross-sectional, we cannot observe county-to-county moves over time 
in the CPS; instead we construct HMO_elig_current_countyit, a population-weighted probability 
that the child currently resides in a managed care county (and thus would be forced to participate 
in managed care if the child enrolled in Medicaid). This probability varies, of course, over time, 
and also because we observe larger metropolitan areas rather than individual counties. 
 Approximately 42 percent of CPS respondents live in one of three metropolitan areas: the 
Louisville MSA, the Lexington MSA and the Cincinnati MSA (which includes northern 
Kentucky). The remaining 58 percent live in unidentified counties in Kentucky, and some of 
these unidentified counties also participate in Medicaid managed care. All children are assigned 
a probability of zero for HMO_elig_current_county in 1996 and 1997 (since Medicaid managed 
care began in November 1997); children in the Louisville MSA are assigned a probability of 1 
from 1998 to 2002. Children in the Lexington MSA are assigned a probability of 1 in 1998 and 
1999, and 0 thereafter. Children in the Cincinnati MSA are always assigned a probability of 0. 
The remaining children (which make up more than half the sample), are spread amongst 
counties that are in the Passport region, the KHS region and other non-managed care regions. 
Based on population, the Louisville MSA contains about 70 percent of the total Passport 
beneficiaries, and the Lexington MSA contains about 65 percent of the total KHS beneficiaries. 
Thus, a significant number of managed care beneficiaries are present in the unidentified counties. 
For children in unidentified counties, we assign to HMO_elig_current_county a population-
weighted probability of living in a managed care county of 0.256 in 1998 and 1999, when both 
Passport and KHS were in operation. This probability drops to 0.141 from 2000 to 2002, when 
KHS ceased operations and the Lexington region switched back to FFS coverage. 
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With these probabilities, the coefficient β1 measures the marginal impact of switching to 
Medicaid managed care on Medicaid participation, private insurance coverage, and no insurance. 
The vector Xijt measures child- and family-characteristics reported in the CPS, including child’s 
age (measured linearly), sex, race, the family’s income (dummies for under 100 percent of 
poverty, between 100-200 percent, between 200-300 percent, and over 300 percent), and family 
homeownership status. The models also include fixed effects for calendar year (1996-2002) and 
geographic regions (Louisville MSA, Lexington MSA, Cincinnati MSA, and unidentified). In the 
results section, we present a variant of equation (3) where we include, in addition to the calendar 
year and region dummies, a region-specific time trend. We also present results excluding 
imputed values for health insurance coverage. Finally, we present a “difference-in-difference-in-
differences” specification in which we interact HMO_elig_current_county with poverty status in 
order to assess whether or not the impact of the introduction of managed care varies by family 
income. 
 
V. Data 
Intensive Margin 
In order to implement our empirical analysis of changes along the intensive margin, we 
were provided with de-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data by the Kentucky 
Cabinet for Health and Family Services. As described above, for each region our sample consists 
of children that i) live in the region's treatment or control counties in January 1997 and ii) are 
continuously enrolled in Medicaid until June 1999.
18
 During these 30 months, there were no 
changes in the company managing the Kentucky Medicaid information systems. 
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 Note that we are not requiring these children to live continuously in one of the treatment or control counties, only 
that they maintain Kentucky Medicaid enrollment. Therefore, a child may live in a Passport treatment county in 
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Electronic Data Systems (EDS) was responsible for managing Medicaid information 
systems for Kentucky from 1994 to 2000 and a new vendor, Unisys, began managing these 
databases in January 2000. During transitions to new vendors with new database models, the 
medical claims information goes through a testing and verification period for about one year. We 
are not confident in the comparability of the new Unisys database with the previous system 
during this intermediate period, which is why we end our analysis in June 1999 (several months 
before the transition). The benefits of using this timeframe include the fact that it spans the 
reform we are investigating and we are assured the changes in utilization we observe are not 
being driven by vendor changes. The cost is that we cannot observe longer-run utilization 
changes. 
After dropping a few children with age discrepancies, we are left with 4,706 children in 
our Passport sample (1,890 initially in one of the 4 Passport treatment counties we are interested 
in and 2,816 initially in one of the 7 control counties) and 13,590 children in our KHS sample 
(4,273 initially living in one of the 9 KHS treatment counties we are interested in and 9,317 
initially living in one of the 14 control counties). Descriptive statistics from our final samples for 
each region (split into treatment and control sample sub-categories) are shown in Table 5. 
Comparing the 1,890 children initially in a Passport county with the 2,816 initially in a bordering 
FFS county, we see that there was a slightly lower probability of moving across county lines 
among the Passport children (24 percent versus 26 percent). On the other hand, there are more 
movers among the children initially in a KHS county than their FFS controls. The amount of 
moving that we observe in both regions reinforces the motivation for our IV approach to control 
                                                                                                                                                             
January 1997 then move to any other part of the state for the remaining 29 months in our analysis and stay in the 
sample, as long as they maintain their public coverage.  
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for migration endogeneity.
19
 Table 5 reinforces the finding from Table 4 that we are comparing 
extremely homogenous sets of counties within each region. The children in our final Passport 
and KHS samples appear extremely similar to their FFS controls in terms of demographics and 
pre-reform utilization. 
Our health care utilization data – which is recorded regardless of whether the payment 
arrangement is FFS or managed care – is at the monthly level. Inpatient services are defined to 
be services delivered in a hospital with an overnight stay, while outpatient services are services 
delivered in clinics or hospitals in which there is no overnight stay (such as an ER visit). 
Professional services typically represent physician services, but could also include services 
provided at locations other than physician offices, such as dental clinics and public health clinics. 
The bottom of Table 5 presents the monthly utilization rates for each type of service in the pre-
period (January 1997-October 1997) and the post-period (November 1997-June 1999) for 
children in each set of counties of interest. These simple summary statistics in many ways tell the 
entire story. We see large reductions in outpatient and professional utilization for children 
initially living in the Passport counties that is not matched by children initially living in the non-
Passport border counties. Children initially living in the KHS counties, while experiencing some 
reduction in outpatient utilization, actually have a slight increase in professional utilization. They 
tend to look much more similar to children initially in the non-KHS border counties (i.e., 
children continuing to receive FFS Medicaid). 
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 These high mobility rates can be corroborated with other data sets. Using the 43,111 unique Kentucky respondents 
in the 2008 American Community Survey (ACS), we find that nearly 16 percent of the sample moved in the last 
year, with approximately 80 percent being within-state moves. Almost half of the within-state moves were from one 
of Kentucky’s 30 Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMA) to another. In the ACS, migration rates were higher among 
children (17 percent moved), and especially high among poor children (26 percent moved). 
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The heterogeneous impact of the two different managed care “treatments” is made 
especially clear in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 compares for each of the three types of services 
differences in the monthly utilization rate for the 1,890 children initially living in a Passport 
county (labeled “treatment”) to the utilization rate for the 2,816 children initially living in a non-
Passport border county (labeled “control”). We see similar utilization rates in the pre-period for 
each type of service and then striking reductions in outpatient and professional utilization for the 
Passport treatments relative to their controls. There seems to be less of a managed care impact on 
inpatient utilization, but the extremely low baseline utilization rate makes the possibility of a 
significant reduction less likely, as does the fact that inpatient stays were still reimbursed on a 
FFS schedule with a withhold, rather than on a capitated payment. 
Figure 4 provides the same comparison for our KHS treatment and control samples. 
These graphs clearly tell a different story. We again see similar utilization rates between the 
treatment and control counties in the pre-period. The KHS pre-period utilization rates also appear 
to be very similar to the Passport pre-period utilization rates, with slightly lower outpatient and 
professional rates and a slightly higher inpatient rate. In the post-period, we see very little 
difference between the KHS treatment utilization rates and the controls. Therefore, these graphs 
suggest a very strong impact of the managed care treatment associated with the Passport program 
and almost no impact of the managed care treatment associated with the KHS program. Our 
empirical results presented in the next section will formalize these findings. 
Extensive Margin 
To examine Medicaid participation, we must rely on non-administrative data, since our 
administrative data only follows children when they are participating in Medicaid. Children can 
become ineligible for Medicaid for many reasons including increases in family income, changes 
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in family structure, aging out of an eligibility group, moving out of the state, and obtaining 
private health insurance. In order to examine the impact of managed care on Medicaid 
participation, we rely on the 1997-2003 March CPS Annual Social and Economic Survey 
(ASEC) (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 2003). We use a larger set of 
years for this analysis because the CPS questionnaire was uniform over the entire period, and by 
using all of these years, we are able to exploit a longer “pre-” period, as well as exploiting the 
fact that managed care was eventually repealed in the KHS region. 
The ASEC asks detailed questions about health insurance for the entire previous calendar 
year. Thus, our dataset contains information on the 1996 to 2002 time period. Health insurance 
status is asked for all household members; the survey includes questions about employer-
provided health insurance, private health insurance, and government insurance. The CPS does 
not directly ask people whether they are uninsured, rather it asks about specific types of 
insurance and respondents who answer “no” to all of the categories are considered uninsured. It 
asks respondents about coverage at any time during the preceding calendar year, so being 
uninsured reflects a lack of health insurance throughout the entire previous calendar year. In the 
analysis that follows, we use health insurance definitions identical to those of the Census 
Bureau.
20
 
We initially extracted 13,990 Kentucky respondents – both children and adults – from the 
March 1997 to 2003 CPS. In our empirical results, we restrict attention to the 27 percent of 
respondents (3,839 respondents) that were under the age of 18. Approximately 42 percent of 
these respondents lived in the Louisville, Lexington or Cincinnati metropolitan areas and the 
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 To be more specific, the CPS explicitly asks about private insurance coverage, employer-based coverage, 
employer-based coverage in one’s own name, direct privately purchased insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, and 
CHAMPUS. It defines “uninsured” as not being in any of the other categories. The health insurance definitions can 
be found at: http://www.census.gov/hhes/hlthins/hlthinsvar.html  
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remainder lived in unidentified areas. More than 28 percent of these respondents had some form 
of imputed information on health insurance; as a result, we estimate all specifications both 
including and excluding imputed values.
21
 
Over the entire 1996 to 2002 time period, among children under 18, roughly 23 percent 
participated in Medicaid, 64 percent had private insurance and 12 percent were uninsured.
22
 
Medicaid coverage among children fell from 25 percent in 1996 and 1997, to 18-20 percent in 
1998 to 2000, and then increased again to 24-25 percent in 2001 and 2002. Although this pattern 
is certainly consistent with the implementation and repeal of managed care affecting Medicaid 
participation, clearly other factors matter as well. Kentucky – like the rest of the United States – 
was experiencing substantial economic growth in the late 1990s, and then that growth stopped 
with the 2001 recession. The unemployment rate in Kentucky fell from 5.1 percent in 1996 to 4.1 
percent in 2000, but increased to 5.6 percent by 2002.
23
 
 
VI. Results 
Passport (Louisville area HMO) - Intensive Margin 
The top panel of Table 6 presents the results of a series of regressions based on equation 
(2) for the Passport region where the dependent variable in each model is a (0, 1) indicator of any 
monthly utilization of professional, outpatient, or inpatient Medicaid services. The key 
independent variable of interest is managed care enrollment (HMO). In order to isolate the effect 
of the Passport managed care program on utilization, each model includes a series of month year 
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 Bollinger and Hirsh (2006) find that in the context of earnings in the CPS, coefficient bias due to the imperfect 
imputation is widespread and often severe. They suggest, in the context of earnings, that a simple alternative is to 
exclude imputations, and base estimates on a respondent-only sample. 
22
 When examining the non-imputed values, private coverage was somewhat lower, and Medicaid coverage and no 
coverage were somewhat higher. 
23
 For more detail, see the following BLS website: http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/all_nr.htm#SRGUNE  
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dummies and child fixed effects. The OLS estimate presented in column 1a suggests that the 
introduction of the Passport program led to a statistically significant 16 percentage point decline 
in the probability of any Medicaid professional utilization for the children in our sample. This is 
relative to a monthly professional utilization rate of 36% in the pre-reform period, thus 
representing a 44% reduction in the overall monthly probability of any Medicaid professional 
utilization. The other OLS estimates suggest a statistically significant 6 percentage point decline 
(66% reduction) in the monthly probability of any outpatient utilization and a more modest 0.1 
percentage point decline (18% reduction) decline in the monthly probability of any inpatient 
utilization. 
Identification in the OLS models is achieved through the assumption that this Medicaid 
reform in Kentucky is an exogenous change to insurance type, not driven in a given county by 
some sort of related changes in Medicaid spending / utilization (policy endogeneity) or because 
of changes in the characteristics of recipients (migration endogeneity).
24
 In our IV models we 
address migration endogeneity by instrumenting actual managed care enrollment with Passport 
or KHS eligibility based on initial county of residence. Because we first observe each child in 
our sample in January 1997, our identifying assumption is that their county of residence in 
January 1997 is exogenous to the implementation of managed care in November 1997. 
Appendix Table 2 presents the results of the first stage regressions in which Passport or 
KHS eligibility based on initial county of residence is used to predict actual managed care 
enrollment (HMO). The instrument is clearly a very strong predictor of actual managed care 
enrollment with a marginal managed care participation rate of 69 percent for Passport and 79 
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 As is argued in Duggan (2004) in the case of California, one could argue in Kentucky that since the planning for 
the introduction of managed care preceded the actual implementation by multiple years, policy endogeneity is 
unlikely to be a major issue. Moreover, the cost dynamics in these border counties are likely to have been far less 
important in policy decisions than the urban centers of the managed care regions. 
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percent for KHS. The estimated marginal take-up rate is not 100 percent in either case because of 
difficulty in measuring managed care enrollment in the first 4 months of the reform and some 
children moving across county lines, potentially into the adjacent managed care area.
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How does the instrument impact the second stage results? The results reported in Table 6 
suggest that using an IV approach leaves the coefficient estimates largely unchanged. There is no 
change in the predicted impact on outpatient services and a slightly larger predicted impact on 
professional services (17 percentage points versus 16 percentage points). The predicted impact 
on inpatient utilization is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels. These results 
suggest that migration endogeneity is not a major source of bias to our OLS estimates of the 
impact of Passport on health care utilization. Although we do observe children moving, those 
moves do not appear to be motivated by differences in Medicaid across counties. 
Overall, we see that the introduction of Passport led to relatively large reductions in 
outpatient and professional utilization, with slightly less statistical support for a reduction in 
inpatient services. Although inpatient services were still reimbursed via FFS in Passport, 
inpatient utilization might still be expected to fall due to better coordination of care and case 
management or due to an increased emphasis on preventive care.  On the other hand, because our 
analysis is focused on children, we might not expect large reductions in inpatient utilization 
given the already low baseline inpatient utilization rate observed for our Passport sample (0.6%). 
A managed care program would likely have more success targeting outpatient and professional 
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 If none of the children in the sample left their county of residence in January 1997, then the indicator of actual 
managed care enrollment in the administrative dataset should be perfectly correlated with our eligibility indicator 
based on initial county of residence (because managed care enrollment is based on county of residence). Table 5 
indicates that children do move across counties within the state, so we did not expect a coefficient of 1 in the first 
stage. In addition, during the first four months associated with the introduction of the Passport and KHS, the 
administrative indicator for actual managed care enrollment does not always match up with the child’s county of 
residence. For example, we observe a small number of cases where a child’s county of residence is a Passport 
county, but the indicator of managed care enrollment is equal to zero (or the opposite situation) during these first 
four months. 
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service utilization for reductions among their child enrollees. Therefore, our Passport findings 
are in line with the general literature on managed care in terms of finding reductions in 
utilization, but the composition of those reductions differs due to the fact that we are focusing on 
children. 
Kentucky Health Select (Lexington area HMO) - Intensive Margin 
Table 6 also presents results of a similar specification estimated using our Kentucky 
Health Select (KHS) sample. The OLS estimate presented in column 1c suggests that the 
introduction of the KHS program actually led to a statistically significant 2 percentage point 
increase (6% increase relative to baseline) in the probability of any Medicaid professional 
utilization. The other OLS estimates suggest a statistically significant 2 percentage point decline 
(16% relative to the pre-reform baseline) in the monthly probability of any outpatient utilization 
and a marginally significant 0.1 percentage point increase (20% increase) in the monthly 
probability of any inpatient utilization. As was the case with our Passport analysis, using an IV 
approach leaves the KHS coefficient estimates largely unchanged, with a loss of statistical 
significance for the inpatient results. Therefore, these results also suggest that migration 
endogeneity is not a major source of bias.   
 Both Passport and KHS decreased outpatient utilization among the children in our 
sample, though Passport was able to do so to a greater degree (66% reduction versus 21% 
reduction). In addition, both programs appear to have had a minimal impact on inpatient care 
utilization for children, which, as mentioned, is not surprising given the low overall utilization of 
inpatient services for children. A key difference between the effects of the two programs is that 
Passport reduced professional utilization by 47%, while KHS actually increased professional 
utilization by 3%. As we will discuss in further detail below, this may be due to differences in 
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the way that each program reimbursed physicians. Recall that Passport set up a capitated system 
to reimburse local physicians, while KHS opted for FFS reimbursement with a 20 percent 
withhold. 
Comparing Treatment Border Counties - Intensive Margin 
 As Figure 1 illustrates, the Passport and KHS regions also share a border, meaning that 
we can compare utilization pre- and post-reform for 5 Passport (Washington, Nelson, Spencer, 
Shelby, and Henry) and 4 KHS (Boyle, Mercer, Anderson, and Franklin) counties that were 
excluded from the previous analysis. The final two columns of Table 4 suggest that these 
counties are extremely similar, other than the managed care region they were assigned to. Figure 
5 presents outpatient, professional, and inpatient utilization comparisons. The figure suggests 
similar utilization rates in both sets of counties prior to the reform, then stronger utilization 
reductions in the Passport counties relative to their KHS neighbors. These graphs therefore lend 
further support to the notion that the Passport plan was better able to reduce utilization than the 
KHS plan, and similar conclusions are found in regression analysis. 
Extensive Margin 
 Table 7 presents the results on the impact of Medicaid managed care for children along 
the extensive margin. The first column, top panel shows that the implementation – and repeal – 
of managed care was associated with a highly significant and economically important decline in 
Medicaid participation. The reduced-form coefficient estimate implies that managed care 
reduced Medicaid participation by 10.5 percentage points, from a pre-reform baseline of 
approximately 25 percent. In the CPS time series, participation dropped by around 5 percentage 
points, suggesting that virtually all the drop in Medicaid participation occurred in the managed 
care regions. The first column, bottom panel shows that the no insurance coverage model 
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estimated coefficient is roughly equal and opposite in sign. Thus managed care appears to shift 
children from Medicaid coverage to being uninsured. These results are both highly significant. 
One cause for concern, however, relates to the effects of managed care on private 
coverage: one might expect that if managed care implicitly cut the generosity of Medicaid, then 
children will leave Medicaid and either obtain private coverage or become uninsured. Yet, the 
coefficient in the private insurance coverage model is negative and marginally significant (first 
column, middle panel). These results on private coverage (as well as Medicaid and no coverage) 
are robust to a number of changes in the model specification: the second column includes region-
specific time trends, and the third column includes these trends and excludes imputed values. In 
all three cases, the conclusion appears the same: the implementation of managed care reduces 
Medicaid participation and increases non-coverage by approximately the same amount, yet 
private coverage falls rather than rises. 
To explore this result further, Table 8 estimates models the impact of managed care for 
poor and near-poor children, as well as higher-income children. These models use the same 
specification as in third column of the previous table. The first two columns stratify the sample 
by income and estimate identical “difference-in-differences” models as the previous table, while 
the third column estimates a “triple difference” model by interacting family income level with 
HMO_elig_current_county  (HMO_CC). The final column shows that the entire effect of 
managed care on Medicaid participation was concentrated exclusively among poor and near-poor 
children, and that there was no effect on higher-income children. On the other hand, the “impact” 
of managed care on private coverage was the same for both higher-income and poor children and 
the impact of managed care on non-coverage was larger for poor and near-poor children than for 
higher-income children. The results for higher-income children strongly suggest that other state-
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wide changes in the insurance market – besides managed care – affected health insurance 
coverage and were occurring in the Passport and KHS regions over time, differentially from the 
rest of the state. Nonetheless, the results on Medicaid participation are striking, and suggest that 
reducing the generosity of Medicaid reduces formal participation in the program. 
Impact of Managed Care on Health Outcomes 
Our Passport results provide compelling evidence that utilization can be reduced through 
the high-powered incentives provided in typical HMO arrangements. One common criticism, 
however, is that this reduction in utilization comes at a real cost: patients do not receive some of 
the appropriate or necessary care they were getting under FFS. Using our same IV framework, 
we examine utilization for asthmatic children. If Passport is providing poorer care for this 
vulnerable population, we would expect a higher hospitalization rate after Passport is 
implemented (Aizer and Currie (2002) & Aizer (2007)). 
Table 9 provides regression results on utilization for various groupings of Kentucky 
counties. The first set of columns breaks out the 4,706 children from the 4 treatment and 7 
control counties for Passport into 327 asthmatic children and 4,379 others.
26
 As in the full 
sample, we see no statistically significant change in inpatient utilization for asthmatics. 
Asthmatics also have similar changes in outpatient and professional utilization. For comparative 
purposes, the second column reports the regression results for the non-asthmatic children. 
Because the asthmatic sample size is relatively small, we expanded the sample in two 
ways. First, we expand the sample to include all 30 month enrolled children in all Passport 
counties as the treatment group and all 30 month enrolled children in all Region 4 counties to the 
south (see Figure 1) as the control group. As the second set of columns show, this increases the 
                                                 
26
 We define an asthmatic as a child with at least one occurrence of the ICD-9 code associated with asthma (493) in 
the 10 month pre-reform time period. 
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number of asthmatics to 2,042, but the basic conclusions do not change. Second, we also expand 
the sample by including all 30 month enrolled children in Regions 4 and 2 as the control group. 
The third set of columns show that this increases the number of asthmatics to 2,465. Again the 
results do not change. Because we find that hospitalizations did not go up for asthmatic children, 
we take this as suggestive, but certainly not conclusive, evidence that there were not detrimental 
health impacts associated with Passport utilization reductions. A full analysis of the health 
impacts of managed care is beyond the scope of this paper, but will be the subject of future 
research. 
 
VII. Specification Checks 
 In the previous section, we exploited the large initial size of our administrative dataset in 
order to create narrow treatment and control groups that overcame many of the standard 
objections that would arise in a quasi-experimental setting. By following the same set of 
continuously-enrolled children in geographically contiguous counties who were differentially 
affected by region-wide transitions to Medicaid managed care, our empirical approach is able to 
address concerns about omitted variables bias and endogeneity. In doing so, we find 
substantively large drops in utilization in the Passport region, but not in the KHS region. 
 In this section we consider a variety of specification checks to test the robustness of these 
results. First we consider how our conclusions would change if we used a larger, but more 
geographically diverse sample. Recall that our “Passport experiment” used only four of sixteen 
counties in Region 3 for the treatment group, as well as seven contiguous counties outside of 
Region 3 for the control group. The “KHS experiment” used nine of twenty-one counties in 
Region 5 for the treatment group, and fourteen counties outside of Region 5 for the control 
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group. In addition, given the differences in plan design, the managed care “treatment” was 
fundamentally different in the two regions. 
Table 10 shows the results of expanding the sample using the same IV methods that were 
used in Table 6 (the coefficients from that table are presented in the first two rows of Table 10 as 
reference). We begin by combining the treatment regions, estimating the effect of managed care 
without regard to the underlying differences between the two regions. As might be expected, the 
treatment effect of managed care is essentially a weighted average of the treatment effects in the 
two managed care regions. Overall, professional utilization falls by 4 percentage points, far 
smaller than the 17 percentage point drop in the Passport region, but a substantially larger drop 
than the 1 percentage point increase observed in the KHS region. The conclusions for outpatient 
utilization mirror those for professional utilization, while the effect on inpatient utilization is in 
all cases insignificant. We conclude that ignoring the underlying incentives created by different 
forms of managed care can lead to very different conclusions about the magnitude of its effect on 
utilization. 
Next, we expand our sample to include continuously-enrolled children in all Region 3 
and Region 5 counties as the treatment group, and all continuously-enrolled children in the other 
six regions as the control group. It should be clear from the comparisons of the eight regions that 
doing so makes the treatment and control groups far more heterogeneous. Relative to the 
approach of focusing on geographically contiguous regions, our estimated impacts of managed 
care are roughly 15 to 20 percent smaller. We interpret this difference as suggesting that un-
modeled, omitted factors are correlated with both the implementation of managed care and 
utilization in the larger sample; for example, it is possible that utilization trends in urban areas 
36 
 
trended differently over time than utilization in rural areas, and the urban areas also adopted 
managed care. 
Up to this point, our analysis has focused on the impact of Medicaid managed care on the 
probability of any monthly medical utilization. Such an approach does not allow us to determine 
where on the distribution of medical spending any observed reductions in utilization are coming 
from. For example, is the 66% reduction in the monthly probability of consuming any outpatient 
services observed in the Passport region achieved by reducing utilization among “heavy” users 
of outpatient services? The regressions reported in Table 11 address this question for outpatient 
and professional services in the Passport region. We create new dependent variables equal to 1 in 
months where the child’s professional or outpatient Medicaid spending exceed the 50
th
 percentile 
of the respective monthly spending distribution (conditional on having positive spending). In the 
first column, the dependent variable equals 1 in a given month if a child has professional service 
spending / claims above $50, and in second column the dependent variable equals 1 if in a given 
month a child has outpatient spending /claims above $100. The results show a 94% reduction in 
the probability of having monthly outpatient spending above $100. This suggests a far stronger 
impact of Passport on outpatient utilization for those with relatively high outpatient spending / 
claims. For professional services we see that Passport focuses on the left tail of the distribution. 
Passport leads to a 37% reduction in the probability of having any monthly professional spending 
above $50, as compared to a 47% reduction in the probability of having any monthly 
professional spending (Table 6).  
 Our final important specification check examines provider participation. Are the 
reductions in Passport utilization coming from reduced access to health care (i.e., fewer 
providers participating in the program), rather than more efficient delivery of services? A 
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managed care network would likely restrict the number of doctors, but were those restrictions so 
severe as to cause the reduction we observe? From the universe of Medicaid recipients in the 
treatment/control counties, we are able to extract unique provider identifiers. Figure 6 illustrates 
that although providers did not grow in the Passport counties (as they did in the control 
counties), they did not shrink either. The differences in levels seem to reflect population size 
differences. As a result, it is difficult to believe that the sharp drop in utilization is coming 
through reduced access. 
 
VIII. Conclusions 
Many researchers have pointed out that simply comparing the utilization of managed care 
enrollees with the utilization of FFS enrollees may not be informative due to the ability of 
enrollees in many circumstances to choose their health plan. The observation that managed care 
plans have lower costs than FFS plans could be explained by managed care plans 
disproportionately enrolling lower utilization / lower cost customers. Therefore a question that 
has persistently plagued both researchers and policymakers alike is whether HMOs and other 
forms of managed care produce lower health care utilization through better aligned financial 
incentives and alternative delivery methods (the pure HMO effect) or by attracting more healthy 
enrollees (enrollee selection). 
We shed new light on this question of the “pure” HMO effect versus “enrollee selection” 
using a quasi-experimental approach that exploits the timing and county specific implementation 
of Medicaid managed care mandates in Kentucky in the late 1990s. The Medicaid program in 
Kentucky was changed from a FFS system to a managed care system in two geographically 
distinct sub-sets of counties, so we compare recipients initially in each of the two sets of 
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“treatment” counties before and after this reform with recipients initially in neighboring 
“control” counties that remained in a FFS system in order to assess the impact of Medicaid 
managed care on child health care utilization (i.e., changes along the intensive margin). 
Along the intensive margin, we find that both managed care plans decreased outpatient 
utilization among the children in our sample, though the Louisville-centered Passport plan was 
able to do so to a greater degree. In addition, both programs appear to have had a minimal impact 
on inpatient utilization for children. A key difference between the effects of the two programs is 
that the Passport plan reduced physician utilization among children, while in the Lexington-
centered KHS plan physician utilization actually increased by a modest amount. Therefore, the 
heterogeneous treatments generated by differences in plan design between the two regions led to 
different outcomes with respect to utilization. While Passport capitated reimbursement for 
physicians and outsourced important administrative functions to an experienced firm, the KHS 
plan handled such administrative functions internally and reimbursed physicians on a FFS basis. 
Our findings, based on roughly a year and a half of post-reform data, foreshadow the eventual 
failure of the KHS plan. Along the extensive margin, we see some evidence of movement of 
children out of formal Medicaid coverage and into no coverage. Finally, we find suggestive 
evidence that the reductions in utilization observed in Passport did not lead to adverse health 
outcomes for asthmatic children, as measured by inpatient hospitalizations. 
Our results should be of interest to policymakers considering Medicaid managed care as a 
cost-containment measure, given the current financial difficulties facing many states and the 
looming challenge of Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). In fact, 
Kentucky is expanding managed care as one way of addressing its current Medicaid budget 
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problems.
27
 In addition, Florida recently approved a massive overhaul of its Medicaid system, 
which will shift hundreds of thousands of Medicaid recipients into HMOs. Plan sponsor, 
Representative Rob Schenck (R-Spring Hill, FL), said “We get to save billions of dollars, and we 
get to deliver better health care.”
28
 Our analysis suggests that up front plan design decisions, 
such as the choice of reimbursement mechanism for physicians, may in large part determine the 
eventual success or failure of any expansions of managed care. 
  
                                                 
27
 See http://chfs.ky.gov/news/Medicaid+RFP11.htm for more details. 
28
 See http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/May/08/Florida-Legislature-Passes-Massive-Medicaid-
Overhaul.aspx  
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Table 1 
Trends in Kentucky Population and Medicaid Enrollment (in thousands) 
Year Statewide 
Population 
Region 3 
Population 
Region 5 
Population 
Statewide 
Medicaid 
Enrollment 
Region 3 
Medicaid 
Enrollment 
Region 5 
Medicaid 
Enrollment 
Statewide 
Medicaid 
Managed 
Care 
Statewide 
Medicaid 
FFS 
1997 3,953 1,093 719 532 112 75 0 532 
1998 3,985 1,102 730 521 109 73 181 340 
1999 4,018 1,114 742 518 106 71 177 341 
2000 4,049 1,125 810 557 114 79 114 443 
2001 4,066 1,132 801 608 126 88 126 482 
2002 4,087 1,139 790 627 131 91 131 496 
Sources: Population estimates are from the Kentucky State Data Center (http://ksdc.louisville.edu/ ) and the Medicaid eligible estimates are from the 
Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services (http://chfs.ky.gov/dms/stats.htm). Passport was implemented in Region 3 from 1998 onward. 
Kentucky Health Select was implemented in Region 5 during 1998-1999. 
 
  
 
Table 2 
Passport and Kentucky Health Select Monthly Capitation Rates (in dollars) 
  Passport 
Eligibility Category Prior to 
November 1997 
November 1997 to 
June 1998 
July 1998 to 
December 1998 
AFDC/TANF N/A 137.00 146.20 
Foster Care N/A 177.38 188.52 
SOBRA N/A 171.02 181.85 
SSI with Medicare N/A 117.00 125.24 
SSI without Medicare N/A 504.65 531.51 
SCHIP N/A N/A N/A 
    
 Kentucky Health Select 
 Eligibility Category Prior to 
November 1997 
November 1997 to 
June 1998 
July 1998 to 
December 1998 
AFDC/TANF N/A 124.18 150.39 
Foster Care N/A 166.26 194.52 
SOBRA N/A 160.28 188.67 
SSI with Medicare N/A 143.03 170.16 
SSI without Medicare N/A 382.39 421.14 
SCHIP N/A N/A N/A 
Source: Adopted from Bartosch and Haber (2004) 
 
  
 
Table 3 
Regional Comparisons using the Census 
 Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 
(Passport) 
Region 4 Region 5 
(KHS) 
Region 6 Region 7 Region 8 
Total Population, 
2006 
235 382 1,177 472 799 400 250 491 
Average County 
Population 
20 32 74 24 38 67 18 26 
White (%) 90.5 88.0 80.7 92.5 86.9 93.0 96.0 96.9 
Living In Same 
House, 1995 
and 2000 (%) 
59.5 56.0 54.0 56.9 48.8 53.9 61.7 66.6 
High School 
Graduates 
In 2000 (%) 
75.8 74.9 80.0 66.8 77.7 81.4 68.1 58.7 
Homeownership 
In 2000 (%) 
75.0 71.2 69.9 73.9 64.9 70.3 77.0 76.1 
Poverty Rate 
In 2004 (%) 
15.6 15.8 13.7 18.9 14.7 10.6 20.0 26.3 
Kentucky 
Counties 
in Region 
Ballard, 
Caldwell, 
Calloway, 
Carlisle, 
Crittenden, 
Fulton, 
Graves, 
Hickman, 
Livingston, 
Lyon, 
Marshall, 
McCracken 
Christian, 
Daviess, 
Hancock, 
Henderson, 
Hopkins, 
McLean, 
Muhlenberg, 
Ohio, 
Todd, 
Trigg, 
Union, 
Webster 
Breckinridge, 
Bullitt, 
Carroll, 
Grayson, 
Hardin, 
Henry, 
Jefferson, 
Larue, 
Marion, 
Meade, 
Nelson, 
Oldham, 
Shelby, 
Spencer, 
Trimble, 
Washington 
Adair, 
Allen, 
Barren, 
Butler, 
Casey, 
Clinton, 
Cumberland, 
Edmonson, 
Green, 
Hart, 
Logan, 
McCreary, 
Metcalfe, 
Monroe, 
Pulaski, 
Russell, 
Simpson, 
Taylor, 
Warren, 
Wayne 
Anderson, 
Bourbon, 
Boyle, 
Clark, 
Estill, 
Fayette, 
Franklin, 
Garrard, 
Harrison, 
Jackson, 
Jessamine, 
Lincoln, 
Madison, 
Mercer, 
Montgomery, 
Nicholas, 
Owen, 
Powell, 
Rockcastle, 
Scott, 
Woodford 
Boone, 
Campbell, 
Gallatin, 
Grant, 
Kenton, 
Pendleton 
Bath, 
Boyd, 
Bracken, 
Carter, 
Elliott, 
Fleming, 
Greenup, 
Lawrence, 
Lewis, 
Mason, 
Menifee, 
Morgan, 
Robertson, 
Rowan 
Bell, 
Breathitt, 
Clay, 
Floyd, 
Harlan, 
Johnson, 
Knott, 
Knox 
Laurel, 
Lee, 
Leslie, 
Letcher, 
Magoffin, 
Martin, 
Owsley, 
Perry, 
Pike, 
Whitley, 
Wolfe 
Notes: Population measured in thousands. Source of data is U.S. Census QuickFacts data for Kentucky: 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21000.html 
 
  
 
Table 4 
Final Study County Comparisons using the Census 
 Passport 
Treatment 
Passport 
Control 
KHS 
Treatment 
KHS 
Control 
Passport 
Counties 
(Shared Border) 
KHS 
Counties 
(Shared Border) 
Total Population, 
2006 
77 112 147 253 126 119 
Average County 
Population 
19 16 16 18 25 30 
White (%) 93.9 95.0 96.5 96.3 89.3 89.0 
Living In Same House, 
1995 and 2000 (%) 
60.7 62.1 58.2 59.6 54.2 53.0 
High School Graduates 
in 2000 (%) 
67.7 64.6 63.7 63.4 76.9 78.0 
Homeownership 
In 2000 (%) 
79.1 78.5 75.5 76.6 77.1 70.3 
Poverty Rate 
In 2004 (%) 
16.7 17.8 19.0 20.6 12.1 12.7 
Counties Breckinridge, 
Grayson, 
Larue, 
Marion 
Butler, 
Edmonson, 
Green, 
Hart, 
Hancock, 
Ohio, 
Taylor 
Estill, 
Harrison, 
Jackson, 
Lincoln, 
Montgomery, 
Nicholas, 
Owen, 
Powell, 
Rockcastle 
Bath, 
Bracken, 
Clay, 
Fleming, 
Gallatin, 
Grant, 
Laurel, 
Lee, 
Menifee, 
Owsley, 
Pendleton, 
Pulaski, 
Robertson, 
Wolfe 
Henry, 
Nelson, 
Shelby, 
Spencer, 
Washington 
Anderson, 
Boyle, 
Franklin, 
Mercer 
Notes: Population measured in thousands. Source of data is U.S. Census QuickFacts data for Kentucky: 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21000.html 
  
 
Table 5 
Summary Statistics using Kentucky Administrative Data 
 Children Initially 
in a Passport 
County 
Children Initially in a 
Passport Control 
County 
Children initially 
in a KHS County 
Children initially 
in a KHS Control 
County 
# children 1,890 2,816 4,273 9,317 
# child months (30 months total) 56,700 84,480 128,190 279,510 
% of children that switched county 23.9 26.0 25.2*** 20.6 
Demographics:     
Age on Jan 1, 1996 7.1* 6.8 7.2 7.1 
% non-white 11.1 9.7 6.5 5.9 
% female 48.9** 45.6 46.7 47.5 
Number of siblings 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Utilization:     
Percentage with any monthly Medicaid:     
Outpatient Utilization 
Jan 97- Oct 97, 
Prior to Medicaid Managed Care 
9.8%*** 8.6% 10.4%*** 9.5% 
Outpatient Utilization 
Nov 97- June 99 
After Medicaid Managed Care 
5.2%*** 8.0% 8.2%*** 9.0% 
Professional Utilization 
Jan 97- Oct 97 
Prior to Medicaid Managed Care 
37.6%*** 35.1% 32.2%*** 36.1% 
Professional Utilization 
Nov 97- June 99 
After Medicaid Managed Care 
24.8%*** 34.3% 32.5%*** 35.6% 
Inpatient Utilization 
Jan 97- Oct 97 
Prior to Medicaid Managed Care 
0.5% 0.6% 0.4%*** 0.5% 
Inpatient Utilization 
Nov 97- June 99 
After Medicaid Managed Care 
0.3%*** 0.4% 0.3%*** 0.4% 
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Notes: The 
stars represent the results of tests for difference in means or proportions between the treatment and control counties within each region. Three 
stars, two stars, and one star imply statistically significant differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
  
 
 
Table 6 
Effects of HMO Enrollment on Health Care Utilization 
 Passport 
 Any 
Professional 
Visits? 
Any 
Outpatient 
Visits? 
Any 
Inpatient 
Visits? 
  OLS 
(1a) 
IV 
(1b) 
OLS 
(2a) 
IV 
(2b) 
OLS 
(3a) 
IV 
(3b) 
HMO Enrollment          -0.160*** 
(0.004) 
    -0.170*** 
(0.007) 
    -0.060 *** 
(0.003) 
    -0.060*** 
(0.004) 
-0.0010* 
(0.0004) 
-0.0010 
 (0.0010) 
30 Month-Year 
Dummies? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Child Fixed 
Effects? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pre-Reform Avg. 
Monthly Utilization 
Rate: 
36% 36% 9% 9% 0.6% 0.6% 
Percent Change: -44% -47% -66% -66% -18% -18% 
 KHS 
 Any 
Professional 
Visits? 
Any 
Outpatient 
Visits? 
Any 
Inpatient 
Visits? 
 OLS 
(1c) 
IV 
(1d) 
OLS 
(2c) 
IV 
(2d) 
OLS 
(3c) 
IV 
(3d) 
HMO Enrollment      0.021*** 
(0.003) 
     0.012*** 
(0.004) 
    -0.016*** 
(0.002) 
    -0.021*** 
(0.002) 
 0.0010* 
(0.0004) 
0.0010 
(0.0010) 
30 Month-Year 
Dummies? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Child Fixed 
Effects? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pre-Reform Avg. 
Monthly Utilization 
Rate: 
35% 35% 10% 10% 0.5% 0.5% 
Percent Change: 6% 3% -16% -21% 20% 20% 
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Notes: These 
regressions also include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are in parentheses. Passport regressions include 4,706 children followed for 
30 months, while the KHS regressions include 13,590 children followed for 30 months. Three stars, two stars, and one star imply statistically 
significant parameter estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
 
Table 7 
Extensive Margin: Impact of Medicaid Managed Care Eligibility on Health Insurance Coverage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Medicaid coverage 
Eligible for Medicaid Managed Care -0.105*** 
(0.030) 
-0.164*** 
(0.041) 
-0.131** 
(0.054) 
R2 0.276 0.278 0.307 
 Private coverage 
Eligible for Medicaid Managed Care  -0.059* 
(0.032) 
-0.129*** 
(0.044) 
-0.145** 
(0.058) 
R2 0.358 0.359 0.360 
 Uninsured 
Eligible for Medicaid Managed Care  0.103*** 
(0.027) 
0.162*** 
(0.037) 
0.191*** 
(0.052) 
R2 0.067 0.069 0.058 
CPS analytic weights included? Yes Yes Yes 
Region*Year Trends? No Yes Yes 
Exclude Imputes? No No Yes 
# children 3,839 3,839 2,420 
Source: Models estimated from March 1997-2003 Current Population Survey data. Notes: Final column is preferred CPS specification. Models 
include dummies for child's sex, race (white/black/other), dummies for households poverty status (0-100, 100-200, 200-300, 300+), homeownership, 
region dummies (regions 3, 5, and 7), year dummies (1997-2002), child's age entered linearly, and a constant term. Eligible for Medicaid managed 
care is the percentage of children who would be eligible based solely on region and year. 
 
  
 
Table 8 
Impact of Medicaid Managed Care by Income Group 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Medicaid coverage 
Eligible for Medicaid Managed Care  -0.344*** 
(0.106) 
0.029 
(0.042) 
-0.012 
(0.063) 
Eligible*Under 200% FPL --- --- -0.266*** 
(0.078) 
R2 0.276 0.278 0.317 
 Private coverage 
Eligible for Medicaid Managed Care  -0.200** 
(0.091) 
-0.102 
(0.076) 
-0.149** 
(0.069) 
Eligible*Under 200% FPL --- --- -0.002 
(0.085) 
R2 0.358 0.359 0.360 
 Uninsured 
Eligible for Medicaid Managed Care  0.375*** 
(0.090) 
0.055 
(0.058) 
0.182*** 
(0.042) 
Eligible*Under 200% FPL --- --- 0.291*** 
(0.064) 
R2 0.067 0.069 0.070 
Income Group Under 200% of FPL Over 200% of FPL Full sample 
CPS analytic weights included? Yes Yes Yes 
Region*Year Trends? Yes Yes Yes 
Exclude Imputed Values? Yes Yes Yes 
# children 1,191 1,229 2,420 
Source: Models estimated from March 1997-2003 Current Population Survey data. Notes: Models include dummies for child's sex, race 
(white/black/other), dummies for households poverty status (0-100, 100-200, 200-300, 300+), homeownership, region dummies (regions 3, 5, and 7), 
year dummies (1997-2002), child's age entered linearly, and a constant term. Eligible for Medicaid managed care is the percentage of children who 
would be eligible for Medicaid managed care. The final column (the DDD specification) includes interactions of poverty level and Eligible for 
Medicaid Managed Care, poverty level and year, and poverty level and region. 
 
  
 
Table 9 
IV Estimates of the Impact of Passport Managed Care on Asthmatic Children and All Other Children 
 (1) 
Original Treatment 
and Control Counties 
(2) 
All Passport Counties 
versus Region 4 Counties 
(3) 
All Passport Counties 
versus Region 2 and 4 Counties 
 Asthmatic 
Children 
All Other 
Children 
Asthmatic 
Children 
All Other 
Children 
Asthmatic 
Children 
All Other 
Children 
Any Professional 
Visits? 
   -0.270*** 
(0.029) 
   -0.170*** 
(0.007) 
   -0.130*** 
(0.009) 
   -0.070*** 
(0.002) 
   -0.140*** 
(0.008) 
   -0.070*** 
(0.002) 
Baseline Rate 57% 35% 54% 29% 55% 30% 
Percent Change -47% -20% -24% -24% -26% -23% 
       
Any Outpatient 
Visits? 
   -0.100*** 
(0.021) 
   -0.060*** 
(0.004) 
   -0.060*** 
(0.006) 
   -0.040*** 
(0.001) 
   -0.060*** 
(0.006) 
   -0.040*** 
(0.001) 
Baseline Rate 18% 8% 17% 7% 16% 7% 
Percent Change -58% -71% -36% -55% -36% -55% 
       
Any Inpatient 
Visits? 
0.0100 
(0.0080) 
   -0.0030*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0030 
(0.0030) 
   -0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0010 
(0.0020) 
   -0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
Baseline Rate 3.0% 0.4% 2.8% 0.4% 2.8% 0.4% 
Percent Change 33% -77% -11% -24% -4% -24% 
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Notes: The 
regressions in this table estimate similar models to those in Table 6. The first set of results divides the sample of 4,706 children into asthmatic 
children (N=327), and all others (N=4,379). The second set of results – with a larger geographic coverage – examines 2,042 asthmatic children 
compared to 31,290 other children. The final set of results examines 2,465 asthmatic children compared to 38,822 other children. Three stars, two 
stars, and one star imply statistically significant parameter estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 10 
Specification Checks 
 
Any 
Professional 
Visits? 
Any 
Outpatient 
Visits? 
Any 
Inpatient 
Visits? 
HMO Enrollment in Passport 
    -0.170 *** 
(0.007) 
-0.060*** 
(0.004) 
-0.0010 
 (0.0010) 
HMO Enrollment in KHS 
     0.012*** 
(0.004) 
    -0.021*** 
(0.002) 
0.0010 
(0.0010) 
HMO Enrollment – Combined Regions 
    -0.040*** 
(0.003) 
    -0.032*** 
(0.002) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
HMO Enrollment – All 120 Counties, Combined Regions 
    -0.051*** 
(0.001) 
    -0.027*** 
(0.001) 
  0.0004* 
(0.000) 
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Notes: All 
models estimated using our IV specification. The results for Passport and KHS are for the specification in Table 6. There are 4,706 observations for 
the Passport specification, 13,590 for the KHS specification, 18,296 for the Combined Regions specification, and 101,649 for the All Counties, 
Combined Regions specification. Three stars, two stars, and one star imply statistically significant parameter estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
 
 
  
 
Table 11 
IV Analysis of Heavy Health Care Users 
 
Indicator for expenditure of $50 or more on 
professional visits during month 
Indicator for expenditure of $100 or more on 
outpatient visits during month 
HMO 
   -0.070*** 
(0.006) 
    -0.020*** 
(0.002) 
30 Month-Year Dummies? 
Yes Yes 
Child Fixed Effects? 
Yes Yes 
Pre-Reform Avg. Monthly 
Utilization Rate: 18.7% 4.7% 
Percent Change: 
-37% -94% 
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Notes: Sample 
includes all 4,706 children from the Passport sample, for all 30 months. Three stars, two stars, and one star imply statistically significant parameter 
estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
 
 
Appendix Table 1 
Services Covered by the State Capitation Payments to the Plans 
Capitated Services Excluded Services 
Inpatient Hospital Services  Dental Services  Mental Hospitals 
Outpatient Hospital Services  Medical Transportation  Psychiatrists 
Urgent and Emergency Services  EPSDT Services Psychiatric Beds (Inpatient Hospital) 
Outpatient Surgical Services  Vision Care Non-Emergency Transportation (Mental Health) 
Medical services provided by:  Preventive Health Services provided by: AIS/MR Services 
• Physicians  • Public Health Departments ICF/MR 
• Advanced Practice RNs  •  FQHCs Targeted Case Management (Behavioral Health) 
• Physician Assistants  • Rural Health Centers Home and Community-Based Waiver Services 
• FQHCs  Hearing Services (under age 21) Certain Medicare-Only Services: 
• Primary Care Centers  Durable Medical Equipment • CORF Services 
• Rural Health Clinics  Alternative Birthing Services • Chiropractors 
Laboratory  Podiatry Services • Physicians Assistant 
X-rays  Family Planning Clinic Services • Physical and Occupational Therapy 
Appropriate Escort Meals and Lodging  Renal Dialysis • Psychologist 
Therapeutic Evaluation and Treatment:  Hospice Services • Clinical Social Worker 
• Physical Therapy  Organ Transplant Services Nursing Facility Services 
• Speech Therapy Specialized Case Management for Children and 
Adults with Complex Conditions 
EPSDT Special Services (Behavioral Health) 
• Occupational Therapy Behavioral Health (Limited to PCP) School-Based Services for Disabled Students 
Home Health Services  Medical Detoxification Early Intervention Services for Infants and Toddlers 
with Disabilities 
Pharmacy and Limited OTC Drugs        
Source: Bartosch and Haber (2004) 
 
  
 
Append Table 2 
First Stage Regression Results of Monthly HMO Enrollment on HMO Eligibility 
  Passport Program KHS Program 
Child is Eligible For Managed Care 
(Based On Initial County of Residence 
and Time Period) 
     0.690*** 
(0.002) 
     0.790*** 
(0.001) 
30 Month-Year Dummies? Yes Yes 
Child Fixed Effects? Yes Yes 
R2 0.69 0.75 
# children 4,706 13,590 
# child - months 141,180 407,700 
Source: De-identified, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. 
Notes: These regressions also include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Three stars, two stars, and one star 
imply statistically significant parameter estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
Figure 1 – Kentucky’s 8 Regions, Including Passport Counties (Region 3) and Kentucky Health Select (Region 5) 
 
Figure 2 – The Final Study Counties 
 
 
Figure 3 
Child Healthcare Utilization Before and After Passport 
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Figure 4 
Child Healthcare Utilization Before and After KHS 
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Figure 5 
Healthcare Utilization In Bordering Passport and KHS Counties 
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Figure 6 
Monthly Count of Unique Medicaid Provider Identifiers in Passport (Treatment) and non-Passport (Control) Counties 
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